Introduction
Firms compete for buyers and suppliers in many different ways and on many different levels. Firms that set ask and bid prices at which they are willing to sell and buy perform the task of market making, the role traditionally attributed to the Walrasian auctioneer. Within a given market place, such market making firms usually not only compete amongst themselves, but face additional competition from alternative exchanges. For example, used car dealers, employment agencies and real estate intermediaries all compete with search markets based on newspaper and internet ads. Similarly, market makers in stock markets and ticket scouts at sports events and concerts face competition from the search markets where buyers and sellers of stocks and tickets, respectively, can meet and trade bilaterally. On top of that, market makers compete across markets. For example, market makers at NYSE compete with Nasdaq dealers, the dealers at the Fish market in NYC compete with those in New Jersey and more generally, retailers and shops in any given city compete with those in neighboring cities.
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In this paper, I analyze competition between market makers when these are active in different market places and when each of them faces competition from an alternative exchange in its market place. The basic set-up is the following. Two market places are located at the West and East end of the Hotelling line, labelled W and E. Each market place hosts a market maker and a search market. A continuum of buyers and sellers who face transportation costs are uniformly distributed between the two places, yet can only trade at one of them. Market makers simultaneously and independently choose ask and bid prices at which they stand ready to sell and buy, respectively. This basic model is then extended to what can be called an appropriately defined game of matchmaker or platform competition. The feature that distinguishes matchmakers from market makers is that the former set participation fees but do not participate in the transactions themselves, whereas the latter set ask and bid prices at which they stand ready to trade.
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The following results obtain. First, as in Spulber (1999, Ch. 3), competing market makers net a positive profit in equilibrium. This is so because differentiation mitigates price competition in exactly the same way as it does in product market competition.
However, these equilibrium profits are smaller by orders of magnitude compared to the model without search markets. The reason is that the demand and supply functions an intermediary faces are constrained by the outside option of participating in the search market. The more attractive a search market for buyers and sellers, the worse the demand and supply functions from the point of view of the intermediary.
Second, buyers and sellers close to the market places trade with intermediaries while the other ones participate in the search markets because those closer to intermediaries have relatively more to gain from intermediated trade than those further away.
Third, an intermediary's profit increases in the quantity traded by the other intermediary, i.e., intermediaries' quantities are strategic complements. The intuition is the following. As in standard models of horizontal product differentiation like Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) , equilibrium is determined by indifferent buyers (and sellers).
In the present model, these are indifferent between joining the search market in W and E. Consider now a quantity decrease by the intermediary in E. From the point of view of more distant buyers and sellers, the search market in E is now more attractive since between market makers when goods are homogeneous and market makers set capacity constraints prior to competing in prices. Neeman and Vulkan (2003) and Kugler, Neeman and Vulkan (2006) study the conditions under which centralized markets, whose microstructure is not modelled, drive out trade based on bilateral negotiations. Gehrig (1998) studies competition between and optimal taxation of two horizontally differentiated stock exchanges, where each stock exchange is the only exchange at its location. Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) and Ellison, Fudenberg and Möbius (2004) study competition between two a priori homogenous auction markets when the numbers of buyers and sellers are finite and when the auction markets are the only exchanges. Nocke, Peitz and Stahl (2004) and Smith and Hay (2005) study competition between market places with a focus on the ownership structure of the market places (or platforms). Armstrong (2006), Jullien (2001, 2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) study platform competition when buyers and sellers do not have an outside option to trading on a platform.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model. Section 3 first derives the equilibrium for the model when there are no search markets. Then the search markets assumptions are described in detail, and I derive, in turn, the search market equilibrium when there are no market makers and when there are market makers. Section 4 discusses the main results and performs some comparative static analysis. It shows that, and why, the presence of an intermediary exerts a positive externality on the other intermediary in the presence of search markets, introduces competition between intermediaries within a market place and compares equilibrium price dispersions when the number of intermediaries differs across markets. Section 5 introduces the matchmaker game and shows that every equilibrium outcome in the market maker game is also an equilibrium outcome in the matchmaker game. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
The following is a natural adaptation of the models of Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) to market making intermediaries. Assume that there is a continuum of buyers and a continuum of sellers, each with measure Each buyer has a gross valuation for the good v, and he either buys one unit of the good or none. Each seller has production costs of zero, and he either produces one unit or none. Both sellers and buyers bear a constant cost t > 0 per unit of distance they have to travel with the good. I assume that v is so large in comparison to t that in any equilibrium all buyers consume, i.e., I assume
This condition guarantees that competition between intermediaries will be so tough that equilibrium profits of the intermediaries are independent of v. It is the same as the condition that guarantees full market coverage in equilibrium in the standard Hotelling model.
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Because of this assumption, no buyers and sellers will be inactive in equilibrium, which contrasts with the models of Gehrig (1993) and Rust and Hall (2003) .
There are two market places, one located at the Westernmost point of the circle and the other one at the Easternmost, as illustrated in Figure 1 . The former is labelled W and the latter E. As an accounting convenience, I let the locations of buyers and sellers increase from 0 to The quantity it sells is the minimum of the quantity buyers demand at its ask price and the quantity supplied.
Motivation and Discussion
Under the assumption that search markets and market makers occupy the same locations, the buyers and sellers who have the most to gain from search market participation, i.e., the high valuation buyers and the low cost sellers, also have the most to gain from trading with intermediaries.
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Modelling the economy in this way amounts to locating all buyers and sellers on separate Hotelling lines, and connecting these at two points.
6
The present specification is most appropriate when the horizontal differentiation is geographical. For example, suppose that W and E are two cities, each of which has its own regional newspaper, and consider intermediaries in labor markets. A firm that seeks an employee can either place an ad in one of the newspapers, whereby it participates in the search market in this city. Alternatively, it can contact an intermediary in this city.
Consequently, search markets and intermediated markets have the same locations.
The industrial organization literature offers two interpretations for horizontal differentiation, both of which are relevant for the present paper. According to the first, which has been implicitly invoked above, firms (or products) are geographically differentiated. According to the second, the differentiation is in a characteristics space. Consumers and producers can, e.g., choose between trading with a retailer specialized in organic food and another one specialized in genetically manipulated food. In all likelihood, some consumers and producers will prefer trading with the former, while others will prefer buying from or selling to the latter. However, because buyers and sellers can also meet in search markets, but can do so only either at W or E, it is necessary for this interpretation to go through to assume that there is an economy wide standardization, such that a farmer can produce only either organic or genetically manipulated food, but nothing in between.
Equilibrium Analysis
As a point of reference, I first derive the equilibrium for the model when there are no search markets. 
Equilibrium Without Search Markets
Letx be the location of the buyer who at ask prices a W and a E is indifferent between buying from the intermediary in W and the intermediary in E.
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As is well known, this . Note that becauseâ depends onb, there is a continuum of equilibria. These are payoff equivalent for market makers but affect buyers' and sellers' welfare in opposite ways. The only constraints imposed on the set of equilibria are the participation constraints for the indifferent buyers and sellers, who travel the largest distances. For the seller and buyer 
Search Markets
Assume now that there is a search market in W and one in E. As before, buyers and sellers have a cost per unit of transportation t > 0. In a given search market, buyers and sellers are uniformly randomly matched. If there are, say, more buyers than sellers in a search market, sellers are matched with probability one, while buyers are matched with a probability proportional to the ratio of the number of sellers over the number of buyers. Once matched, a buyer and a seller share the gains from trade evenly. The assumptions underlying the organization of search markets are similar to those of Gehrig (1993) . A difference is that he assumes take-it-or-leave-it offers, whereas here sellers and buyers share gains from trade evenly. Because here there are two search markets whereas in his model there is but one, the equilibrium outcome will be somewhat different in my model. Another difference to Gehrig's model that has already been mentioned is that there are no inactive buyers and sellers because all possible buyerseller matches generate positive surplus. It seems also possible to model the search market as a dynamic matching marketà la Spulber (1996) and Rust and Hall (2003) , where buyers and sellers search for an opportunity to trade with middlemen. As in the homogenous goods model I expect both models to yield very similar inverse demand and supply functions facing intermediaries.
Equilibrium Without Market Makers
For this subsection, assume that there are no market makers. Let v c and v c be, respectively, the lowest and highest net valuations of consumers present in a given search market. Similarly, denote by v p and v p , respectively, the lowest and highest net cost of producers present in a given search market. Notice that the maximal distance a producer travels is no larger than Lemma 1 In any equilibrium with search market participation in both cities, the fol-
The single-crossing result reported in Lemma 1 has first been stated by Gehrig (1993) .
The result implies that the sets of buyers and sellers joining a search market will be convex sets and will include the buyer with the highest net valuation and the lowest cost seller. That is, buyer and seller with location 0 will join the search market in W and the buyer and seller at 1 2 will join the search market in E. Moreover, because all buyers and all sellers in these sets will join the same search market, the distribution of buyers and sellers active in a search market will be uniform.
Let v c be the net valuation of a buyer joining a search market, where the highest and lowest cost sellers have costs v p and v p and where the probability of a match for a buyer is γ c . Then, the expected utility of the buyer v c is
where
is the density for the uniform distribution from which sellers' costs are drawn.
The formula after the second equality has a neat interpretation. Consider the second term inside the bracket,
. This is the expected cost of the producer to whom the buyer will be matched. Consequently, the difference between v c and the expected cost is the aggregate surplus buyer v c expects to generate. If matched, the buyer just gets one half of this surplus because of the even sharing assumption, which explains the fraction 1 2 that pre-multiplies the bracket.
Similarly, consider a seller with cost v p who joins a search market where the highest and lowest valuations of buyers are v c and v c and where the probability of being matched is γ p . Then,
Perfect Equilibria Clearly, not joining a given search market if no one else joins it is a best response for every buyer and seller. Therefore, there is always a trivial equilibrium where one or both search markets are inactive. However, these equilibria are not perfect. join the search market in W (E).
Equilibrium with Market Makers and Search Markets
To see the potential for market making, observe from equation (3) between buying at this price and joining the search market, i.e.,
The more efficient producers on average, the higher buyers' expected utility from search and thus the lower their willingness to pay for intermediated trade. Of particular interest is the reservation price of the buyer with the highest net valuation active in the search market, i.e.,
since this is the reservation price that is relevant for the market maker. If it sets a = a(v c ), all buyers with greater net valuations will prefer buying from the market maker to search market participation, and all buyers with smaller net valuations will prefer participating in the search market.
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Analogously, one can derive a reservation price b(v p ) for a seller with net cost v p such that seller v p is indifferent between participating in the search market and selling
The higher consumers' valuations on average, the larger the expected utility derived from search for a producer. Consequently, intermediaries need to increase the bids they offer in order to attract a given producer. For reasons analogous to those for buyers, the bid price relevant for an intermediary will be the one that makes the most efficient seller in the search market, v p , indifferent between participating in the search market and selling to the intermediary. This bid price is
I now derive the inverse demand and supply function facing the intermediaries and then solve for the equilibrium prices. In order to do so, however, one first needs to (tq
Analogously, the expected utilities from search in W and E for sellerỹ satisfy
Notice thatx andỹ increase (decrease) in q
). This has some interesting implications, to which I will return in Section 4 below. 
Indifference Between Intermediated Trade and Search Market
Given the inverse demand and supply functions (9) and (10), the profit of the market 
Notice that in the present model quantities are strategic complements, i.e., q
, which has to do with the observation made above thatx andỹ decrease
will hold in equilibrium. Thus, equilibrium quantity traded by an intermediary will be q * = 3 26
. Inserting q
into the inverse demand and supply functions (9) and (10) yields the equilibrium ask and bid prices , labelledΠ, depict the intermediaries' equilibrium profits absent search markets.
Let me discuss the result and compare it to some of the results in the literature. First, the claim of Proposition 2 is not that there is a unique equilibrium, but that there is a unique equilibrium where the two search markets and the two market makers are active. Nonetheless, the uniqueness of equilibrium in the presence of search markets contrasts with the continuum of equilibria in the model without search markets.
14 Second, as in the models of Gehrig (1993) and Rust and Hall (2003) , equilibrium is characterized by a partition of the sets of sellers and buyers. High valuation buyers and low cost sellers trade with intermediaries, and less efficient producers and lower valuation consumers participate in search markets.
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This happens in the presence of competition between intermediaries who net positive profits in equilibrium.
Third, the result contrasts with the prediction of Neeman and Vulkan (2003) ) is not a best response to itself. An interesting question, not pursued any further here, is whether the equilibrium with active search markets is more plausible than (some of) the equilibria where search markets are inactive, and vice versa. To see what "implausible" means in the current context, suppose that market makers were able to offer sellers bid prices that are so high that every seller fares strictly better by selling to an intermediary than when joining a search market.
If these bid prices are equilibrium prices, then it seems natural to assume that market makers would be able to coordinate on these high price equilibria. On the other hand, if no such bid prices exist, then it seems also natural to assume that buyers and sellers could coordinate on joining search markets, so that the equilibria without active search market would appear implausible. A natural conjecture is that the equilibria without search markets are implausible for moderate values of v/t, while for large values, the equilibrium with search markets is implausible.
Discussion
I first go through the comparative static exercise of comparing the equilibrium profit of an intermediary when there is no competitor and when there is one under the assumption that both search markets are active in both equilibria. Second, I introduce Cournot competition between market makers within each city. Third, I compare the distributions of equilibrium prices in the search markets when the number of intermediaries differs across markets.
Complementarity
So as to derive the equilibrium behavior of the intermediary in W when there is no intermediary in E, plug q E = 0 into W 's reaction function, which is given in (12) 
A few comments are in order. First, I haven't shown yet that there is no profitable deviation for the monopoly under which it extinguishes one search market or both. The proof that no such deviation exists is in the Appendix. Second, though the result may seem surprising, the intuition for it is very clear. Consider Figure 5 for an illustration.
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The top panel depicts the equilibrium configuration with two intermediaries and two search markets. Everything being symmetric,x =ỹ = 1 4
holds. After the exit of the intermediary in E, buyers and sellers close to E join the search market in E. Thus, the search market in E becomes more attractive from the perspective of buyers and . In equilibrium, these are at 
Competition Within Each Market Place
Though there is some evidence, both theoretical and empirical, that independent market makers within a given market place may act collusively,
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in which case the assumption of monopolistic market making within a market place is appropriate, it is important and interesting to see what happens if there is competition between market makers both within a market place and across markets. A simple way to do this is to assume that market makers in a given market place competeà la Cournot. This can be justified as a short-cut to a more complicated model where, much like in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , market makers set capacity constraints prior to setting prices, where capacity constraints are such that trade up to capacity is costless and trading any quantity beyond is prohibitively costly. The first result was to be expected from the discussion of complementarity. The Cournot equilibrium profit and equilibrium quantity (or capacity) of a market maker in W increases when the number of competitors in E increases. That is, all the incumbent market makers in W will optimally expand their capacities when the intermediated market in E becomes more competitive. Result (ii) can be seen as a corroboration, or application, of the result by Neeman and Vulkan (2003) that centralized trade drives out trade based on bilateral negotiations. there is an intermediary in W and none in E. The prices p and p denote, respectively, the lowest and highest price in either search market for the case with two intermediaries.
Price Dispersion in Search Markets
Finally, denote by σ k p the variance of equilibrium prices in search market k when there is no intermediary in E and by σ p the variance of equilibrium prices when there is an intermediary in each city.
Proposition 5 If only the market maker in W is active, facing a search market in E and W , then the equilibrium price dispersion in the search market in W (E) is smaller (larger) than when both intermediaries are active. That is,
(i) p E < p < p W < p W < p < p E and (ii) σ W p < σ p < σ E p .
Market Makers vs. Matchmakers
Up to now, the assumption was maintained that sellers are paid for providing the good, regardless of whether a market maker attracts any buyers at all. On the up side, this assumption of "standing ready to buy" has the advantage of eliminating coordination problems of buyers and sellers. On the down side, however, it precludes many interesting applications. For example, intermediaries in many markets do not actually buy goods to stock, but rather make payments only when the transaction is completed. For example, a job market intermediary typically only pays wages once a worker is matched to a firm. Similarly, intermediaries in housing markets do typically not buy or sell houses and apartments, but rather require a fee from buyers and/or sellers, which becomes due only when a contract is written.
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Clearly, any customer of such an intermediary will not only be concerned about the fees it charges, but also about the number (and quality) of sellers and buyers it attracts. This is why these types of intermediaries can be called matchmakers, or platforms. Though there are substantial differences between matchmakers and market makers, there is also a great degree of similarity between the two types of intermediary. In particular, as I show next, every equilibrium outcome in a game with market makers is also an equilibrium outcome in an "appropriately defined" game with matchmakers. I begin by introducing the game with matchmakers, whence it
should become clear what I mean by appropriately defined.
The Matchmaker Game Matchmakers charge fees φ c ≥ 0 and φ p ≥ 0 to consumers and producers for joining their platform. I assume that these fees are due when joining the matchmaker (or platform), i.e., before eventually being matched. This assumption is made mainly for convenience, though it is not completely innocuous.
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I also assume that each matchmaker sets an internal transaction price of p = v 2 at which a buyer and a seller on the platform exchange the good. This is a simple way to make sure that a matchmaker generates the same gross utility for buyers and sellers as a market maker if it attracts the same buyers and sellers.
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In case the number of agents of one type (buyers or sellers) exceeds the number of the other type, the agents on the short side are matched with probability one, and those on the long side are matched with a probability less than one.
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Buyers and sellers are uniformly distributed on semicircles of length 1 2
and have transportation costs t. Gross utility is v for every buyer, and matchmakers are located at W and E. There may or may not be search markets in W and E as well.
I assume also that in addition to joining either search market and either intermediated market, all buyers and sellers may remain inactive.
Before stating and proving the proposition, it is useful to note the connection between the fees φ c and φ p set by matchmakers and ask and bid prices a and b set by market be the prices set by a market maker. Then, the fees
are equivalent in the sense that they generate the same utility for buyers and sellers, conditional on being matched with probability one. To see this, note that the net utility Let me briefly comment on this result. The proof is straightforward and uses the fact that not joining a platform is always a best response if no one else joins it. Thus, whenever a matchmaker deviates from a "prescribed" behavior, all buyers and sellers can punish the matchmaker by not joining it. Anticipating this, every matchmaker optimally chooses not to deviate.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first model where platforms compete with one another and, on top of that, with simultaneously open search markets.
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For many applications analyzed in the literature, e.g., platforms that match men and women and business-to-business platforms, the outside options for potential platform customers obviously exist. The usually implicit assumption that these outside options do not depend on the behavior of the platforms is certainly critical. The present model provides a first step into the direction of modelling this kind of interactions.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes competition between market makers who are horizontally differen- 
and
Note that because of the continuum assumption, whether a particular buyer joins market k has no effect on γ k c . Therefore, be the number of buyers joining W in equilibrium. Since by hypothesis search markets are balanced, q is also the number of sellers joining W , and all buyers and sellers will be matched in either market. Then, the buyer at location q must get at least the level of utility from the search market in W as from the one in E. That is,
where tq = v . Thus, both markets must be of equal size.
Part II: Without loss of generality, assumex <ỹ, so that buyers are rationed in market E and sellers in market W , and assume that this is an equilibrium. When joining the search market in W , buyerx gets utility
tỹ , while when
−ỹ holds. In equilibrium,x must be indifferent between the two markets, so . On the other hand, the seller
tx − tỹ when joining the search market in W and
tx − tỹ holds. In equilibrium,ỹ must be indifferent between the two markets.
A necessary condition for this is − 2ỹ >x. Taken together, the equilibrium conditions are thus
and by assumptionỹ >x.
The final step is to show that conditions (16) , (17) . However, the conditions in (16) require also , the first inequality in (16) requiresỹ < 1 4
, which contradicts (17) . Hence, there is no equilibrium with unbalanced search markets.
So as to complete the proof of the proposition, consider now the constraints in the second part of the proof of Lemma 2 and replace all strict inequalities with weak inequalities. The only case when all constraints are satisfied is whenx =ỹ = 1 4
.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Existence. I first show that the strategies mentioned in the proposition constitute an equilibrium. It has already been shown in the text that given that search markets exist where all buyers and sellers behave as stated, market makers' prices are mutually best responses. It has also been shown that given these prices and given the behavior of all other buyers and sellers, every buyer and seller is best off playing the strategy assigned to him in the proposition. What remains to be shown in order to prove existence is therefore that no market maker has an incentive to unilaterally deviate and to extinguish the search markets.
Consider the market maker in W who can "extinguish" the search market by attracting all buyers and sellers who are not attracted by the intermediary in E. That is,
where the right-hand side of both equations is the net utility of the seller and buyer at . In other words, the bid price required by this deviation exceeds the ask price. Therefore, this deviation cannot be profitable.
However, there is a priori no reason why the intermediary should contend itself with symmetric strategies when attempting to extinguish the much disliked search market.
Similar to the model of Stahl (1988) , it is in principle enough to buy the whole stock in order to corner the market. Depending on the elasticity of the demand function, it may then be in its best interest to sell less than it bought. I am going to show now that even this asymmetric deviation strategy is not profitable.
So as to see this, note first that the buyer with location q < 
Third, I show that there are no equilibria where an intermediary sets asymmetric prices.
Claim I: For any spread z that is symmetric around
, there is a unique quantity q * (z) of sellers and buyers joining each intermediary.
Note: The concern here is that in principle there may be a coordination problem between sellers and buyers because if more (high valuation) buyers are active in the search market, search markets are more attractive for sellers. I will show that because of the market maker's commitment to buy any alternative candidate equilibrium unravels.
Proof: For analytical ease, I assume that if there is rationing at an intermediary, the efficient rationing rule applies. That is, buyers and sellers who are closer to an intermediary have priority over agents who are further away. Buyers and sellers who are rationed can go back to the search market. Step 1a ] joined the intermediaries in W and E, the two search markets are symmetric, the assumption is indeed correct. Moreover, the search markets being symmetric after step 1a, the assumption thatỹ = will hold in any subsequent step.
Step 1b (ty 1 + t
However, since only the y 1 < x 1 closest buyers will be served, only the y 1 closest buyers will leave the search market. So, let x 1 = y 1 .
Step 2a: Given steps 1a and 1b, there is a y 2 ∈ (y 1 , q * Step 2b: Apply the same reasoning as in step 1b to establish that x 2 = y 2 .
Step k: In general, after the k-th step, the buyers and sellers attracted by an intermediary will be
Let k go to infinity and use the formula for a geometric sum to see that increases buyers' reservation prices to buy from the intermediary because search market participation is less attractive. However, as I will show now, such a policy will never be optimal because it will be in the interest of the intermediary to sell all the quantity it buys. follows (which of course is not feasible, but that is immaterial for the present argument). In other words, the intermediary would like to sell more than its stock if there were no costs of acquiring stock (and neglecting any other constraints). Now, becausê
holds by hypothesis, it will be both possible and desirable to sell more than for these inverse demand and supply functions to be valid in the first place. Consequently, the optimal quantity will be as small as necessary, i.e., will equal 3 14
. Inserting this value into the profit function reveals immediately that the profit will be zero. Hence, this deviation does not pay.
Second, the intermediary may want to take over the whole market by extinguishing the search market in E, too. However, so as to attract the buyer and seller at is the price at which they would trade in the search market in E if only these two agents join the search market in E. Clearly, this deviation entails a negative profit and is therefore not profitable. (11) . Thus, in the limit intermediated markets drive out search markets. ). Second, from the fact that the strategies of the buyers and sellers are an equilibrium in the game with market makers, it follows that the actions of buyers and sellers in the proposition are optimal in the game with matchmakers, given that all the other buyers and sellers behave as stated. What therefore remains to be shown is that a matchmaker cannot increase its profits given the strategies played by buyers and sellers and the other matchmaker.
Proof of Proposition
To see that buyers and sellers can deter any deviation by a matchmaker, note that not joining any matchmaker if no one else joins a matchmaker is a best response for every buyer and seller. Thus, if buyers and sellers join the matchmakers if and only if these set φ c = φ c (a * * ) and φ p = φ p (b * * ), and otherwise remain inactive or go to the search markets, deviation does not pay for matchmakers either.
details. Efficient rationing is not implausible if agents are served on a first come first serve basis and if agents who are closer to an intermediary reach the intermediary before others do.
22 An additional fee may also be charged to the customer to be admitted to the database of the intermediary.
23 If fees are only due in case a match occurs, then not joining a platform may be weakly dominated by joining it, whereas this is not true when fees are charged upon joining a platform.
24 Alternatively, and equivalently, platforms could use uniform random matching of buyers and sellers, who share the gains from trade evenly. In the presence of search markets, platforms would then simply induce a separation of random matching markets.
25 For example, if there are 5 buyers and 3 sellers, each buyer is matched with probability 0.6.
26 This is not surprising, of course. It is clear, though, that the harsh punishment strategy I make use of in the proof is only sufficient.
27 See Gehrig (1993) for an early model in which a monopoly platform competes with a search market.
28 I am grateful to an anonymous referee whose suggestions helped shorten and clarify the proof.
29 An alternative way to see this is as follows. Letq be the location of the buyer and seller who are the only agents in the search market in W and who would consequently be the agents with the lowest valuation and the highest cost in the search market in E. Then, their utility from the search
